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Sydney B. Horton* The Manitoba Language Rights
Reference and the Doctrine of
Mandatory and Directory
Provisions
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference the Supreme Court of
Canada determined that although there exists in Anglo-Canadian law a
doctrine that makes a distinction between statutory provisions that are
mandatory, in the sense that failure to comply with them will lead to
invalidity of the act in question, and those that are directory, in the sense
that failure to comply will not necessarily lead to such invalidity, the
doctrine should not be applied when the constitutionality of legislation is
in issue.' I propose to examine the rejection of the doctrine in Canada, to
contrast the Court's reasoning with examples of the application of the
doctrine in Australia and New Zealand when the constitutionality of
legislation was in issue, and to suggest why its rejection in Canada was
unwise and unnecessary.
The Court rejected the doctrine while asserting its power to declare
invalid laws not enacted in conformity with a manner and form
requirement stipulated in the Constitution. This aspect of the case
deserves comparison with the way other courts have dealt with manner
and form requirements and is occasion to contemplate some possible
consequences of the rejection of the mandatory and directory provision
doctrine.
These issues emerge from three of the four questions posed in the
Reference. Those three were: (1) are the requirements of s. 133 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 and of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1879
mandatory; 2 (2) are those statutes and regulations of Manitoba that were
not printed and published in both English and French invalid by reason
of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870; and (3) if the answer to (2) is
affirmative, do those enactments that were not printed and published in
English and French have any legal force and, if so, to what extent and
under what circumstances.3
*Chief Legislative Counsel, Government of Yukon.
1. Reference concerning language rights under section 23 of the Manitoba Act 1870 and
section 133 of the Constitution Ac 1867, [1985]2 S.C.R. 347. Court of Canada rendered June
13, 1985, at 22.
2. Manitoba Act, 1870, R.S.C. 1970, App. 11, No. 8; and Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1970,
App. II No. 5, under the title British North America A c4 186Z
3. Supra, note I at 2.
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The reference arose out of the Manitoba Legislature's failure after
1890 to comply with s. 23, a failure that persisted even after 1979 when
the Supreme Court of Canada held in the Forest4 case that Manitoba's
Official Language Act5 of 1890, which purported to authorize unilingual
enactment and publication of Manitoba's Acts, was in conflict with s. 23
and therefore unconstitutional. The Forest case had not dealt with the
issue of whether unilingual English Acts of Manitoba enacted in
pursuance of the OfficialLanguage Act were themselves unconstitutional.
That issue, with respect to two such Acts, 6 was before the Court in the
appeal of the Bilodeau case,7 but disposition of that case was deferred
pending disposition of the Reference which raised the issue more broadly
in relation to all such Acts.
Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 states:
Either the English or the French language may be used by any person in
the debates of the Houses of the Legislature, and both those languages shall
be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either
of those languages may be used by any person, or in any Pleading or
Process, in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under the
Constitution Act, 1867, or in or from all or any of the Courts of the
Province. The Acts of the Legislature shall be printed and published in
both those languages.
The Supreme Court of Canada had already resolved two major
problems in the interpretation of s. 23 when the Manitoba Language
Rights Reference came before it. The effect of its decisions in Forest,
dealing with s. 23, and in Blaikie No. 11 and Blaikie No. 29, dealing with
the virtually identical language of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867
and its operation in Quebec, was to establish that s. 23 requires not only
bilingual printing and publication but also bilingual enactment of Acts;
further, "Acts" in s. 23 encompasses not only statutes but also regulations
("delegated legislation") made by the Government, or a minister or group
of ministers of the Government, or by other bodies or agencies subject to
the approval of a minister or group of ministers. The Reference therefore
questioned the validity of virtually the entire living body of the statutory
law, including regulations, of Manitoba and most of what had previously
been enacted and then repealed or become spent after having been in
force for some time.
4. Attorney General of Manitoba v. Forest, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032.
5. S.M. 1890, c. 14.
6. Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. H-60; and Summary Convictions Act, R.S.M. 1970,
c. S-230.
7. Bilodeau v. Attorney-General of Manitoba, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 393 (Man. C. A.).
8. Attorney-General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016.
9. Attorney-General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312.
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Given the words of s, 23, the normal grammatical sense of "shall", and
the decisions in Forest'0 and Blaikie No. 1, 1 it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court of Canada reiterated in the Reference that the provisions
respecting the use of English and French in the Records, Journal, and
Acts are "mandatory in the normally accepted grammatical sense of that
term. That is, they are obligatory. They must be observed."'12 The Court
repeatedly used "mandatory", "imperative" and "obligatory"
interchangeably with reference to common usage.' 3 One cannot
reasonably gainsay this aspect of the Court's conclusion, and counsel for
the Attorney-General of Manitoba expressly accepted it when putting the
proposition that in the jurist's specialized usage of mandatory and
directory the provisions should be classified as directory, thereby
avoiding automatic invalidity in consequence of non-compliance.
The Court accepted that the distinction between mandatory and
directory provisions exists in Anglo-Canadian law aad described the
distinction as being "between statutory provisions that are mandatory, in
the sense that failure to comply with them will lead to invalidity of the
Act in question, and directory, in the sense that failure to comply will not
necessarily lead to such invalidity."' 4 The Court then quoted the
following passage from Montreal Street Railway Co. v Normandin,15 not
only as authority for the existence and description of the distinction, but
also as a springboard for its decision not to apply the distinction when the
constitutionality of legislation is at issue:
When the provisions of the statute relate to the performance of a public
duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect
of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to
persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the
same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has
been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect
of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done.
There is a point that deserves emphasis here, all the more so because
the Supreme Court of Canada did not express or pursue it. The leading
cases show that the distinction between mandatory and directory
provisions is not between those that must be obeyed and those that need
not be. Both mandatory and directory provisions are obligatory. Both are
to be observed. The distinction has only to do with the consequence of
breach of the provision. If the provision is mandatory, invalidity of the
10. Supra, note4.
11. Supra, note 8.
12. Supra, note I at 20.
13. Id at 14-20.
14. Id at20-21.
15. [1917] A.C. 170 at 174-75 (P. C.).
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act in question is automatic; if the provision is directory, the consequence
might be invalidity or some other remedy. The distinction is to be drawn
by ascertaining the intention of the legislature and needs to be drawn only
after it has been determined that the provison is indeed obligatory and
that it has not been complied with. A provision is to be classified as
mandatory only if the legislature intended that every breach of the
provision was automatically to be invalid ab initio, regardless of the
circumstances of the particular breach. The intention of the legislature is
to be ascertained by normal methods of statutory interpretion, with
special attention to the nature and purpose of the duty in question, and
by weighing the consequences of holding the provision to be mandatory
or directory. 16 Several judicial pronouncements support these comments.
I now turn to some of them.
Sir Arthur Channell's words in Montreal Street Railway Co. have
perhaps been more often quoted than studied. Under his formulation the
characteristics of a directory provision include that it relates "to the
performance of a public duty"; further, his words "the neglect of them,
though punishable" are express recognition that there is or might be a
remedy for a breach. The same point is made by Lord Penzance in
Howard v. Bodington'17
A thing has been ordered by the Legislature to be done. What is the
consequence if it is not done. In the case of statutes that are said to be
imperative, the courts have decided that if it is not done the whole thing
fails, and the proceedings that follow upon it are all void. On the other
hand, when the Courts hold a provision to be directory, they say that,
although such provisions may not have been complied with, the
subsequent proceedings do not fail.
This passage recognizes that irrespective of whether it is a mandatory or
directory provision, the "thing has been ordered by the Legislature to be
done". Thus, the doing of it is obligatory.
In Simpson v. Attorney-General of New Zealand, 18 a case concerning
provisions of a constitution, Hutchison, J. A., expressed the point well:
... whether a provision in a statute is to be read as obligatory or merely
as permissive is one question, and whether a provision expressed in an
obligatory form is mandatory or merely directory is another question..
And in Clayton v. Heffron,19 another case concerning constitutional
provisions, the High Court of Australia recognized directory provisions as
"legal requirements which it is unlawful to disregard".
16. J. Evans, Mandatory andDirectory Rules (1981), 1 Legal Studies 227.
17. (1877),2P R203 at2lO.
18. [1955] N.Z.L.R. 271 (N.Z.C.A.) at 281.
19. (1960), 105 C.L.R. 231 (H.C. of A) at 247.
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I have chosen these extracts showing the obligatory nature of directory
provisions because that is the point the Supreme Court of Canada did not
express or pursue. In all other respects the formulation of the doctrine in
these cases (Montreal Street Railway Co.; Howard v. Bodington," Simpson;
Clayton v. Heffron) is similar to that given by the Supreme Court of
Canada.
With reference to the consequences of breach of a directory provision,
the Supreme Court of Canada's words are that breach "will not
necessarily lead to invalidity". Those words import that invalidity is a
possible, but not automatic, consequence of the breach. The Court's
choice of words here seems significant for at least two reasons. First,
many previous formulations of the doctrine have not referred to
invalidity as a possible consequence of breach of a directory provision;
rather they have merely driven home the point that invalidity is not
automatic. The Supreme Court of Canada, while reiterating that
invalidity is not automatic, has recognized that in principle it is possible.
Second, the difference between automatic invalidity for breach of a
directory provision would seem, on the analogy of things void and
voidable, to be that under the former the act never existed in law whereas
under the latter it did exist until it was declared invalid. Having spun this
thread the Court did not weave it into the fabric of its decision.
The Supreme Court of Canada gives three principal reasons for its
belief that the doctrine about mandatory and directory provisions should
not be applied when the constitutionality of legislation is in issue.
One reason given is that "the doctrinal basis of the mandatory/
directory distinction is difficult to ascertain". The Court thought that
basis to be the serious general inconvenience or injustice Sir Arthur
Channell spoke of in Montreal Street Railway Co.20. But that is a
misconstrual of what Sir Arthur said. His words were that invalidity
"would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who
have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time
would not promote the main object of the Legislature" 21. In Bilodeau22 in
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Freedman, C. 3. M., saw those factors
merely as two among other tests for drawing the distinction between
mandatory and directory. He expressed the doctrinal basis as follows:
The rationale for this approach is that the legislature could not have
intended widespread chaos to be the consequence of non-compliance with
a particular statute.
20. Supra, note I at 21.
21. Id
22. Supra, note 7 at 401.
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His thought is supported by the Courts in Clayton v. Heffron3 and in
Simpson24, both dealing with provisions in a constitution. Surely
ascertaining the intention of the legislature whose enactments it is your
duty to construe and apply is an appropriate doctrinal basis. And having
ascertained that the provision in question is obligatory, surely it is
appropriate to further explore the intention of the legislature by posing
the question: Does the legislature intend every breach of this provision to
result automatically in the invalidity ab initio of the act in question
irrespective of the consequences, or does it rather intend that there be
some flexibility to tailor the remedy to fit the particular breach?
The fact is, the Supreme Court of Canada did accept the power of this
rationale because it lies at the root of the Court's determination that the
rule of law, which the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982, intend to prevail,
can prevail in Manitoba only if the Court deems valid those same laws
which it holds invalid ab initio, the fictional validity being allowed to
continue so long as need be to give Manitoba's Government and
Legislature time to translate into French the entire legislative output,
including regulations, of nearly a century and to re-enact it all in English
and French in compliance with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. Thus,
having asserted that the doctrinal basis for the mandatory and directory
distinction was uncertain, the Court went on and in its disposition of the
Reference expressed and, to support its fiction, gave effect to that
doctrinal basis, which is to avoid the consequence of automatic invalidity
of proceedings ab initio where the legislature did not intend such
consequences to flow from the breach of the obligatory provision.
The only explanation advanced by the Supreme Court of Canada for.
its difficulty in ascertaining the doctrinal basis for the mandatory and
directory distinction was a quotation from R. ex reL Anderson v.
Buchanan5 in which the court confessed inability to draw the distinction
and the temptation to strain a point to call a provision directory merely
because the court felt the consequences in the case at hand would be
inconvenient if the provision were directory. But that explanation is
tantamount to saying: somebody else has trouble understanding this,
therefore I am having trouble. It also concentrates on inconvenience or
injustice to a particular litigant, whereas the doctrine places the emphasis
inconvenience on injustice to the public generally. Further, it assumes
that avoidance of inconvenience or injustice is itself the objective,
whereas the doctrine has one look to the inconvenience only as one factor
among many in determining the intention of the legislature.
23. Supra, note 19.
24. Supra, note 18.
25. (1909), 44 N.S.R. 112 (C.A.).
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A second reason given by the Court for not applying the doctrine
seems to emerge from its reiteration that the fundamental guarantees in
s. 23 are entrenched in the Constitution and beyond the power of the
province to amend unilaterally, a result established in Blaikie No. 126 and
in Forest.7 In that connection the Court observed: "4Those guarantees
would be meaningless and their entrenchment a futile exercise were they
not obligatory." Note here the word "obligatory". The Court later
quoted28 in the same connection and with approval the following passage
from Monnin, J. A., of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in his dissent in
Bilodeau:29
The legislation [section 23] is clear, and speaks of "shall be used" and
"shall be printed". There is nothing directory in that language.
Furthermore, entrenched linguistic rights are by nature mandatory and
never directory. If they were directory only, the risk is that they would
never be enjoyed or be of any use to those to whom they were addressed.
If they were merely directory it would ily in the face of entrenchment. The
authorities.., on the mandatory or directory nature of legislation have no
application to entrenched rights.
In these passages, "entrenchment" seems to convey only that provision
is in the legislated constitution, as opposed to ordinary legislation, and is
not amendable by either the ordinary legislature process or by unilateral
action of a single, in this case provincial, legislature. The Court and
Monnin, J. A., also likely used the word further to emphasize why they
felt the provision to be obligatory, or mandatory in the normal
grammatical sense of the word.
These passages show that the Court felt that an "entrenched" provision
was inherently not subject to placement in the mandatory and directory
classification. In a predominantly written constitution such as Canada's
the constitutionality of legislation is nearly always, if not always,
contingent upon such "entrenched" provisions. From these premises it
follows that the constitutionality of legislation can never be contingent
upon the mandatory and directory classification. Thus the classification is
not to be applied. That is the Court's reasoning, but is the first premise
well founded?
The foundation offered 30 is that in many American authorites, none of
which are cited, in Blaikie No. 1, 31 in Forest, 32 and in Bribery
26. Supra, note 8.
27. Supra, note 4.
28. Supra, note I at 23.
29. Supra, note 7 at 407.
30. Supra, note I at 23.
31. Supra, note 8.
32. Supra, note 4.
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Commissioners v. Ranasinghe, 33 the courts did not mention the
mandatory and directory distinction when ruling that legislation which
had not been enacted in compliance with constitutional manner and form
requirements was invalid. To that list one could add: Harris v. Donges,34
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadhr,35 McDonald v.
Cain;36 Attorney-Generalfor New South Wales v. Trethowan;37 and Akar
v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone.3 8
The Court's reasoning here seems specious. In all of those cases the
ground of invalidity affected only one Act, not the entire body of
statutory law enacted by a provincial legislature over the course of some
96 years. More importantly, from the fact that the mandatory and
directory distinction was on many occasions not mentioned one ought at
least as readily to infer that the provision was without argument thought
or conceded to be mandatory as to infer that the mandatory and directory
distinction was thought not to be applicable to provisions of a
constitution. Silence does not speak unequivocally.
These passages about "entrenched" provisions are also noteworthy
because through them the Supreme Court of Canada seems to assume
that a directory provision is not obligatory and that a failure to observe
it does not give rise to a remedy, a view that is different from that
expressed by the weight of authority.
A third reason given by the Court for rejecting the doctrine is:
... the harm that would be done to the supremacy of Canada's
Constitution if such a vague and expedient principle were used to interpret
it. It would do great violence to our Constitution to hold that a provision
on its face mandatory, should be labelled directory on the ground that to
hold otherwise would lead to inconvenience or even chaos. Where there
is no textual indication that a constitutional provision is directory and
where the words clearly indicate that the provision is mandatory, there is
no room for interpreting the provision as directory. 9
But the doctrine about mandatory and directory provisions does not
suggest that "a provision mandatory on its face" should in some cases be
labelled directory. The Court's assertion here is logical only if the Court
understands the distinction between mandatory and directory provisions
to be a distinction between provisions that are obligatory and provisions
that are not obligatory. The passage is another indication that the
33. [1965] A.C. 172.
34. [1952] T.L.R. 1245 (S.C. of S.A., App. Div.)
35. 103 S.C. 2764 (U.S.S.C.)
36. [1953] V.L.R. 411 (S.C. of V., Full Crt)
37. [1932] A.C. 526 (PC.).
38. [1970] A.C. 853 (PC.).
39. Supra, note 1 at 24.
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reasoning of the Court is indeed based on the assumption that a directory
provision is not obligatory. If that was the Court's assumption, then its
reasoning stands to reject only a doctrine under which mandatory is
obligatory and directory is not obligatory; it does not stand to reject the
doctrine that the weight of authority describes under which both
mandatory and directory are obligatory in the sense that they must be
obeyed.
As for the alleged vagueness and expediency of the principle, Clayton
v. Heffron,40 Simpson,41 and Namoi Shire Council v. Attorney-General
for New South Wales 2 illustrate that there are concrete criteria by which
to apply the doctrine in a principled judicial way where constitutional
validity of legislation is in issue and that rather than expediency, in the
sense of politic rather than just, the principle allows flexibility to help
assure that the constitution will be construed and applied so as to achieve
its object.
Clayton v. Heffron43 is one of those exciting gems that inspires re-
examination of fundamental precepts of constitutional jurisprudence. The
purpose of the suit was to obtain an injunction to prevent the holding of
a referendum under the Constitution Act, 1912-1956 of New South
Wales on the question of whether a Bill for the abolition of the
Legislative Council (the upper House in a bi-cameral Parliament) should
be adopted. The alleged illegality was that procedures required by the
Constitution Act preliminary to the referendum had not been followed.
By virtue of a concession made by counsel for the defendant, the case was
argued and decided as though it were one where, instead of an injunction
being sought to prevent a step that might lead to enactment, the Act nas
assumed to have been enacted and a declaration of its invalidity was
being sought. Section 7A of the Constitution Act protected the Legislative
Council from abolition except on approval of the majority of electors
voting in a referendum. Section 5B established a procedure to resolve
conflict or deadlock between the Legislative Assembly and the
Legislative Council. In pursuance of that procedure and the procedure for
constitutional amendment, the Assembly set about to abolish the
Council. The Council refused to consider the Bill for its abolition.
Through the Council's refusal to participate, a meeting of the managers
of the Houses, required by section 5B as a condition precedent to
subsequent steps, did not occur and a subsequent joint meeting of
members of both Houses was convened by the Governor and occurred in
40. Supra, note 19.
41. Supra, note 18.
42. [1980] 2 N.S.W. L.R. 112 (S. C.)
43. Supra, note 19.
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fact but in defiance of a resolution of the Council. Despite those
departures from the procedure required by the Constitution Act, the
Assembly took the next step in the stipulated procedure and resolved that
the Bill for abolition be sent to referendum. Some members of the
Council attempted by court action to thwart the Assembly, but the High
Court of Australia determined that the departures from the procedure
would not affect the validity of the Act enacted by such irregular
procedures.
The judgment of the Court was given by Dixon, C. J., and although
the passage relevant here is long it merits reproduction rather than
paraphrase:
[Is] it in accordance with principle to treat the omission of such a step in
the legislative process [the conference of managers] as invalidating the
statute once it is approved by the electors and assented to by the
Crown...
There is no doubt that the words 'after a free conference between
managers' contain an implied direction that such a conference shall take
place. In the same way the words relating to the joint sitting of members
of the Houses import an intention that the Governor shall exercise the
authority to convene a joint sitting of members. But it is an entirely
different thing to find in the direction an intention that a departure from
the procedure shall spell invalidity in the statute when it is passed. In this
case there are two matters with which we are dealing: the legislative power
and the procedure for its exercise. The principles of the common law
distinguish sharply between invalid attempts to exercise a legislative power
and departures from the prescribed course for its exercise which may or
may not bring invalidity as a necessary consequence. In the end the
distinction must be governed by the intention expressed by the legislature
conferring the power and prescribing the steps to be taken in its exercise.
But commonly no express declaration is to be found in a statutory power
as to the effect on validity [of a departure] from the procedure laid down.
The question is then determined by reference to the nature of the power
conferred, the consequences which flow from its exercise, the character
and purpose of the procedure prescribed. The power here is to enact a
public general statute and the power to do this extends to a statute altering
the constitution of the Legislature so that if the statute is to be void every
future piece of legislation passed by the Legislature of the State so
constituted will have no force or effect. The matter of procedure
prescribed is a matter affecting the process in Parliament... The point of
procedure concerns a step preliminary to the calling by the Governor of a
joint sitting of the members of the two Houses. Such a meeting was
convened.. .and a meeting of certain members the two Houses took
place... The preliminary step of appointing managers freely to confer
rested on the co-operation of both Houses in conflict. It would rest with
either House to neglect the duty and so bring the proceedings to
nought.. .before one reaches the conclusion that the failure to fulfil the
requirement of holding a free conference will result in invalidity of the law
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if adopted, it is natural to treat the fact that the Legislative Council may
decline a conference of managers as a reason to be added to the other
considerations for holding that it is not a matter going to validity. Lawyers
speak of statutory provisions as imperative [mandatory] when any want of
strict compliance with them means that the resulting act, be it a statute, a
contract, or what you will, is null and void. They speak of them as
directory when they mean that although they are legal requirements which
it is unlawful to disregard, yet failure to fulfil them does not mean that the
resulting act is wholly ineffective, is null and void.. .the decided cases
illustrating the distinction relate to much humbler matters than the validity
or invalidity of the constitution of the Legislature of a State. But in them
all the performance of a public duty or the fulfilment of a public function
by a body of persons to whom the task is confided is regarded as
something to be contrasted with the acquisition or existence of private
rights or privileges and the fact that to treat a deviation in the former case
from the conditions or directions laid down as meaning complete
invalidity would work inconvenience or worse on a section of the public
is treated as a powerful consideration against doing so. Is it possible to
imagine a stronger case of inconvenience than the invalidation, perhaps at
some future time, of a constitutional provision possessing all the outward
appearances of a valid law on the ground that when it was made managers
of the Council had not met with managers of the Assembly before the
members of the two Houses were required by the Governor to meet.44
The procedural requirement that was not observed in Clayton v. Heffron
is obviously not of the same importance as the fundamental language
right expressed in s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. But I do not use
Clayton v. Heffron to suggest that the obligatory provisions of s. 23 ought
to be classified as directory. Rather, I use the reasoning of the case to
suggest that the doctrine distinguishing between mandatory and directory
provisions, both of which are obligatory, ought not to be rejected as
inapplicable in cases where the constitutionality of legislation is in issue.
Clayton v. Heffron stands as a clear exposition of the doctrine and as
eloquent witness to the doctrine's utility when construing and applying
provisions of a constitution.
That utility is further illustrated by Simpson.45 In that case the
constitutional validity of the legislative output of several Parliaments was
challenged on the ground that the Governor General had not made the
writs of election of members returnable within the time prescribed by the
constitution, it being alleged that he was one day late. Through
imt~p~etation to establish hoi to zount the days coyetly the coxut
narrowly escaped having "to deal with the appellant's sweeping
contention that, if his main submission succeeded, the effect would be to
44. Id. at 245-47.
45. Supra, note 18.
206 The Dalhousie Law Journal
invalidate all subsequent proceedings of Parliament".46 However, for one
Parliament, that sweeping contention had to be faced because there was
for it the further indisputably true fact that the Governor General had not
issued his warrant for a general election within the time required by a
constitutional provisions, it being accepted by all that neither he nor his
advisors could fairly be criticized for the delay. Having noted that the
royal prerogative was the source of the power to call the election, the
court said of the provision in question:
This provision does not purport to impose any limitations, restrictions, or
conditions upon the exercise of the prerogative. What it does purport to do
is to place a duty upon the Governor-General in aid of the summoning of
Parliament.. .the main object [of the provision] is to sustain, and not to
destroy the House of Representatives.47
It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that [some
accidental or unavoidable delay] should affect the prerogative right to call
Parliament.48
The court went on to hold49 that although the provision here was
obligatory, not permissive, it was directory and not mandatory because
the Legislature did not intend invalidity of all subsequent proceedings to
be the consequence of non-compliance with the provision; on the
contrary, such invalidity would frustrate the fundamental intention of the
Legislature, which was that Parliament should be summoned after an
election.
The doctrine was also applied in Namoi Shire CounciI0 where the
validity of an Act was challenged on the ground it was enacted in
contravention of the Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly, those
Orders having statutory force by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1902
although made by the Assembly rather than by the whole Parliament.
That the Standing Orders in question were obligatory was not doubted.
The Court thought the heart of the matter to be "whether on the true
construction of the Constitution Act, compliance with Standing Orders
made under s. 15 [of the Constitution Act] is a condition of the validity
of a law otherwise validly enacted thereunder." 51 The Court inferred
from the following factors that compliance with them was not a
condition of validity and therefore the Standing Orders in question were
directory:
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 280.
49. Id. at 281.
50. Supra, note 42.
51. Id. at 644.
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(1) the Constitution Act vested plenary law making power in Parliament
comprising Queen, Legislative Council, and Legislative Assembly;
(2) there was no express stipulation that compliance with the Standing
Orders was a condition of the validity of the Acts of Parliament;
(3) each House made its own Standing Orders, subject to the appro-val
of the Governor;
(4) the Standing Orders embraced only procedural matters, and many of
those procedural matters were relatively insignificant;
(5) if the Standing Orders were mandatory, the consequences would
indeed be inconvenient especially if a challenge to an Act's validity
did not come until a long time after its enactment;
(6) the nature and function of the Standing Orders was to facilitate the
plenary power to legislate.
The reasoning of the Courts in Clayton v. Heffron, Simpson, and
Namoi shows that the mandatory and directory provision doctrine, far
from harming the supremacy of the constitution, can be applied so as to
respect the constitution and further its objects; it further suggests that the
rigidity created by the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of the
doctrine is at least as likely to harm the supremacy of the constitution as
is the application of the doctrine.
By rejecting the mandatory and directory provision, the Court put
itself in the same position it would have been in had it accepted the
doctrine and classified the relevant provisions of s. 23 as mandatory.
Having climbed to the precipice and boldly chosen to leap lively forth,
the Court cast about for the rule of law and a doctrine of state necessity
to assure a safe landing in the troubled waters below. It fashioned the
fiction of invalid laws being deemed valid for an indefinite time. The
Court could have preserved the mandatory and directory provision
doctrine for its utility in future case and come to the same final
disposition. The Court could even have classified s. 23 as directory and
still chosen the same final disposition.
The classification as directory would have created the opportunity for
the Court to have been more flexible in fashioning a remedy. For
example, it could have declared that all laws already enacted in
contravention of s. 23 were valid notwithstanding the contravention,
declared that all laws enacted and published in the future without
compliance with s. 23 would be subject to being declared invalid, and
ordered that the Government of Manitoba as soon as practical translate
and publish in French the statutes and regulations currently in force, and
in default of compliance with the order, risk a declaration of invalidity in
relation to those laws. The United States Supreme Court has already
shown the way in its approach toward desegregation of schools so as to
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end violation of the equal protection of the law guarantee. That court's
approach was to require the school authorities to dismantle the
unconstitutional segregated school systems with all deliberate speed. This
meant a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance. If the
authorities needed more time to comply it could be permitted if necessary
in the public interest and consistent with good faith compliance at the
earliest possible date.52 That approach seems especially well suited for
adaptation to enforce language rights. We have no idea whether or why
the Supreme Court of Canada thought this approach to a remedy was
deficient. The Court's reasoning moved it inexorably to automatic
invalidity and, therefore, no choice about remedy - the remedy had to
be total compliance to avoid invalidity; flexibility came only through the
time for total compliance which was purchased at the cost of a fiction
deeming valid what was declared invalid, thereby letting nullities in the
law live on, a leap that Freedman, C. J. in Bilodeau53 found difficult and
the Courts in Clayton v. Heffron, Simpson and Namoi Shire Council
found unnecessary.
The implications of the inflexibility flowing from the Courts rejection
of the mandatory and directory distinction are highlighted when that
rejection is coupled with the Court's readiness to review whether manner
and form requirements fixed by the constitution for the legislative process
have been complied with.
The Court's process of review starts with the proposition that:
The Constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the people to be
governed in accordance with certain principles held as fundamental and
certain prescriptions restrictive of the powers of the legislature and
government.54
The Court reaffirms its earlier statement in Amax Potash Ltd v.
Government of Saskatchewan, a case involving division of powers
between federal and provincial governments:
A state.. .is sovereign and it is not for the Courts to pass upon the policy
or wisdom of legislative will... but the general principle must yield to the
high requisites of the constitution in a federal state. By it the bounds of
sovereignty are defined and supremacy circumscribed.. .it is the high duty
of this Court to insure that the legislatures do not transgress the limits of
their constitutional mandate and engage in the illegal exercise of power.55
52. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Cooper v.Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958); Giffin v. Prince Edward County Board of Education, 377 U.S. 218 (1968); Green "
v. County SchoolBoard, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
53. Supra, note 7 at 402.
54. Supra, note 1 at 28.
55. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576 at 590.
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The Court's decision in the Patriation Reference56 asserted the same.
Even more to the point is s. 52 of the Constitution Ac 1872:
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
That s. merely restates in the context of Canada's "patriated" constitution
what had in any event been the law through joint operation of the Statute
of Westminster, 193157 and s. 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 186558
under which Canada has a tradition of judicial review of validity of
legislation. Such a tradition is important because it influences
receptiveness of bench and bar to extension of the scope of review, even
if most of the tradition is in cases concerned with distribution of power
between federal and provincial governments; this point has been
elaborated on in articles by Owen Dixon and W Friedmann.59
Finally, the Court referred to Ranasinghe60 in support of its conclusion
that "in a case where constitutional manner and form requirements have
not been complied with, the consequence of such non-compliance
continues to be invalidity."'61
In Ranasinghe the Privy Council was concerned with an Act to amend
the constitution of Ceylon that the constitution required bear the
Speaker's certification that the Act had passed by a 2/3 majority. The
Act did not bear that certification. The constitution stipulated that the
certification was conclusive as to whether the required 2/3 majority
existed. Relying on Edinburgh Railway Co. v. Wauchope,62 counsel
sought to sustain the Act by invoking the enrolled bill rule by which:
All that a Court of Justice can do is look to the parliamentary roll: if from
that it should appear that a bill has passed both Houses and received Royal
Assent, no Court of Justice can inquire into the mode in which it was
introduced into Parliament, not into what was done previous to its
introduction, or what passed in Parliament during its progress in its
various stages through both Houses.
The Privy Council disposed of that with the following:
The English authorities have taken a narrow view of the Court's power to
look behind an authentic copy of the Act. But in the constitution of the
56. Re'Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 841,848,877.
57. 22 Geo. V, c. 4 (U.K.).
58. 28 and 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.).
59. 0. Dixon, The Law and the Constitution (1935), 51 A.L.J. 590; W. Friedmann,
Trethowan's Case, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Changes (1950), 24
A.L.J. 103.
60. Supra, note 33.
61. Supra, note I at 30.
62. (1842). 8 C1. and F. 710; 8 E. R. 279.
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United Kingdom there is no governing instrument which prescribes the
law-making powers and the forms which are essential to those powers.
There was, therefore, never such a necessity as arises in the present case for
the Court to take any close cognizance of the process of law-making...
When the Constitution lays down that the Speaker's certificate shall be
conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any Court of
law.. .The Courts.. .have a duty to look for the certificate in order to
ascertain whether the constitution has been validly amended. Where the
certificate is not apparent, there is lacking an essential part of the process
necessary for amendment.
[When the certificate is lacking] is it a valid Act in the course of whose
passing there was a procedural defect, or is it an invalid Act which
Parliament had no power to pass in that manner?
[A] legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that
are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to make
law. This restriction exists independently of whether the legislature is
sovereign.
The proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once
established, has some inherent power derived from the mere fact of its
establishment to make a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority
which its own constituent instrument has said shall not be a valid law
unless made by a different type of majority or by a different legislative
process.
This cut by the Privy Council through the Gordian Knot tied by the
enrolled bill rule is all the more magnificent because in Hoani Te Heuheu
Tukino,63 a case from New Zealand, and in Labrador Company,64 a case
from Canada, the Privy Council had invoked the enrolled bill rule in aid
of its refusal to inquire into the validity of Acts whose enactment was
alleged to have been procedured by misrepresentation or to be premised
on demonstrable misunderstanding. For that limited purpose the rule is
certainly still alive in England, as Pickin65 shows, and likely still alive in
Canada, although s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
inviting as it does examination of the premises upon which the legislature
acted, might further restrict the potential operation of the rule.66
The Supreme Court of Canada's acceptance of Ranasighe not only
reduces the role of the enrolled bill rule but also lays to rest the conflict
between Gallant,67 where the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
declared an Act invalid for want of compliance with the Constitution Act,
63. Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v.Aotea District Maori Land Board, [1941] A.C. 308 (P.C.).
64. Labrador Company v. The Queen, [1893] A.C. 104 (P.C.).
65. British Railways Board v.Pickin, [1974] A.C. 765 (H.L.).
66. E. Conklin, Pickin and its Applicability to Canada
67. Gallant v. The King, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 425 (S.C. of P.E.I.)
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1867 requirements about Royal assent, and Irwin68 where the Exchequer
Court of Canada invoked the rule to reject the suggestion it should
declare an Act invalid on the ground it imposed a tax and was not shown
to have been presented by message of the Governor General as required
by s. 54 of the Constitution Act, 1967. Dicta of Laskin, C. J., in In re
Agricultural Marketing Act had suggested that the reasoning of Irwin
would not be adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.69
In Ranasinghe the constitutional requirement related to the form of an
Act; the thing was not an Act unless in the required form. That is a
helpful analogue to the requirement of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870
that an Act be enacted, printed, and published in English and French. But
s. 23, particularly the implied requirement that the Bill be in both
languages as it passes through the legislative process, can also be viewed
as a stipulation as to the manner in which the power to legislate is to be
exercised. For this aspect the reasoning of the Privy Council in
Trefhowan70 is move germane. There, by virtxe of an -amendment under
one government, the constitution of New South Wales contained a
provision prohibiting a Bill to abolish the Legislative Council from being
presented for Royal Assent unless it had been approved by a majority of
electors in a referendum; that provision also expressly said it could be
repealed or amended only by the same procedure. Under a succeeding
government both Houses of the Legislature passed Bills to remove that
provision from the constitution and seemed intent on presenting them for
Royal Assent. Opponents of that move brought a suit to obtain an order
enjoining officers of the Legislature presenting the Bills for Assent. In
response to the argument that the members were masters in their own
Houses and could in whatever manner they chose exercise the
Legislature's power to amend the constitution the Privy Council said,
after determining that, despite argument to the contrary, power to make
the amendment did exist:
The question then arises, could that Bill, a repealing Bill, after its passage
through both chambers be lawfully presented for the Royal assent without
having first received the approval of the electors in the prescribed
manner?.. .the Bill could not lawfully be so presented. The proviso.. .states
a condition that must be fulfilled before the legislature can validly exercise
its power to make the kind of laws that are referred to in that sentence...
In order that s. 7A may be repealed.. .the law for that purpose must have
been passed in the manner required by s. 7A. ..Y
68. The King v. Invin [1926] Ex. C.R. 127.
69. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 at 1227.
70. Attorney-Generalfor New South Wales v. Trethowan, [1932] A.C. 526 (P.C.).
71. Id. at 540.
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Harris v. Donges,72 a South African case, and McDonald v. Cain,73 an
Australian case, are further examples of the reasoning of Trethowan being
applied in cases where the prescribed manner of legislative action was not
followed. In the former, the Court declared invalid a constitutional
amendment that was not passed in conformity with the required manner,
namely, a 2/3 majority of a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament.
In the latter the Court declared invalid a constitutional amendment not
passed by an absolute majority of members of each House as the
constitution required.
Implicit in cases like Ranasinghe and Trethowan is an overriding of
not only the enrolled bill rule but also another bastion of parlimentary
privilege, namely, the rule that the courts have no jurisdiction over the
management of the internal proceedings of the legislature, internal
proceedings being those which do not affect the rights of persons
exercisable outside the legislature, 74 the legislature itself being sole judge
of whether the requirements for its proceedings have been complied with.
The Privy Council decision in Kielly v. Carson75 and the Supreme Court
of Canada's in Landers v. Woodworth76 restrict the operation of the rule
to the extent, that for a legislature like Manitoba's created by statute, the
privileges and immunities of the legislature and the members are limited
to those either expressly conferred by or pursuant to statute, or
necessarily incidental to the existence and status of the body or the
reasonable exercise of its functions.77 The issue is relevant here because
the implied requirement in s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 for bilingual
enactment relates to a matter of internal proceedings within the
legislature. The Supreme Court of Canada did not speak to the issue. But
the rule has been expressly overridden in and for the purposes of at least
three cases dealing with manner and form requirements, namely, Clayton
v. Heffron,78 Namoi Shire CounciJ79 and McDonald v. Cain,80 and such
overriding is necessarily implicit in the reasoning of the other manner and
form cases. Clayton v. Heffron puts it most bluntly: if the constitution
makes validity dependent on a proceeding within Parliament, the courts
must take cognizance of it.81 However, the rule was overridden only for
72. [195211 T.L.R. 1245 (S.C. of S.A., App. Div.)
73. [1953] V.L.R. 411 (S.C. of V., Full Ct).
74. Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884), 12 Q.B.D. 271.
75. (1842), 13 E.R. 225.
76. (1878), 2 S.C.R. 158.
77. Namoi Shire Council supra, note 42.
78. Supra, note 19.
79. Supra, note 42.
80. Supro, note 73.
81. Supra, note 19 at 234.
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the purposes of those cases concerned with constitutional validity of
legislation, it was not overruled for all purposes.
This rule about internal proceedings and, more especially, the enrolled
Bill rule both tend to sustain a conception of the supremacy of Parliament
under which Parliament cannot bind a succeeding Parliament to
observance of obligatory manner and form rules for the legislative
process in Parliament.
The reasoning of Trethowan and Ranasinghe has been the occasion for
re-examination and reformulation of the conceptions of the supremacy of
the law and the supremacy of Parliament. The reformulation was well
expressed by Sir Ivor Jennings8 2 and Owen Dixon 3 long before
Ranasinghe, but more recent comments on it came from Geoffrey
Marshall84 and Catherine Swinton.85
In the words of Owen Dixon:
It is of the essence of Parliamentary sovereignty that the Courts of law,
once there is before them an authentic expression of the legislative will,
shall give unquestioned effect to it according to what appears its true scope
and intent. But it is of the essence of the supremacy of the law that the
Courts shall disregard as unauthorized and void the acts of an organ of
government, whether legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits
of the power that the organ derives from the law.86
A wide distinction in any case exists between the powers of legislation and
the mode and procedure for their exercise.87
[Trethowan established that the] very power of constitutional alteration
cannot be exercised except in the form and manner which the laws for the
time being prescribe.88
It is at this point that the conception of the supremacy of the law is
allowed to prevail over the conception of the supremancy of the
Legislature. If a requirement of the existing law is one which goes to
manner and form of legislation, then that requirement cannot be
disregarded and any attempt to legislate, which does not comply with it is
void.. .[the rule in Trethowan is] a modem reconciliation of the supremacy
of Parliament. For it is the demarcation of the limits of operation of the
two principles. The law existing for the time being is supreme when it
prescribes the conditions which must be fulfilled to make a law. But on the
82. Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and The Constitution, (5th ed. London: University of London
Press) at 149-156.
83. Supra, note 59.
84. G. Marshal, Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Recent Development (1966-67), 12 McG. L. J.
523.
85. C. Swinton, Challenging the Validity of an Act of Parliament The Effect of Enrolment and
Parliamentary Privilege (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 345.
86. Supra, note 59 at 596.
87. Id. at 603.
88. Id.at601.
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question what may be done by the law so made, Parliament is supreme
over the law.89
Dixon's proposition has practical significance which might be all the
greater in Canada given the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of the
relevance of the mandatory and directory doctrine when the
constitutional validity of legislation is in question. Under ss. 44 and 45 of
the Constitution Ac4 1982, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
each have a restricted power of unilateral amendment of the Constitution
of Canada and of the province respectively; the manner and form of
proceedings within Parliament or the legislature is one field for unilateral
constitutional agmendment. Further, even without looking to the
Constitution, manner and form requirements for legislative proceedings
can and do exist by ordinary statute and by Standing Orders. For the
purposes of Dixon's proposition, the distinction between a requirement
that is in the constitution and one that is not, seems irrelevant. In this
proposition, the key element is that the "requirement" is indeed a
requirement and that it is prescribed by law. When Dixon's proposition
is combined with the Supreme Court of Canada's assertion that the
mandatory and directory doctrine is irrelevant, what will the Court do
when it has before it a challenge to the validity of an Act that on the face
of it is not in conformity with the Interpretation Act requirement that the
fact and date of Royal Assent be endorsed on it, or an Act that was not
enacted in conformity with the Standing Orders, or an Act that was
passed by a House of Commons sitting one member short of the quorum
required by s. 48 of the Constitution Ac4 1867.
When using Ranasinghe to support its rejection of the mandatory and
directory doctrine, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to infer that the
reasoning of Ranasinghe was inconsistent with applying the doctrine
where constitutional validity of legislation was in issue.90 But there is no
inconsistency. The reasoning of Ranasinghe, like that of Trethowan and
the other cases similar to them, assumes that the Court has before it an
obligatory provision breach of which is intended by the legislator to result
in automatic invalidity of the proceedings. That is the premise from
which their reasoning proceeds. When the mandatory and directory
doctrine is applied, it is used to determine whether that premise is
established for the case at hand. This is the synthesis between cases like
Ranasinghe, where the mandatory and directory doctrine were not
mentioned, and cases like Clayton v. Heffron, where the doctrine was
applied. That this is so is evident from the fact that cases in the Clayton
v. Heffron group recognize Ranasinghe, and before it Trethowan, as
89. Id. at 603-604.
90. Supra, note 1 at 23.
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authority to carry out the review of validity and from the belief common
to both groups that:
Of course the framers of a constitution may make the validity of a law
depend upon any fact, event or consideration they may choose, and if one
is chosen which consists in a proceeding in Parliament the Courts must
take it under their cognizance in order to determine whether the supposed
law is a valid law.91
The principle expressed in that passage shows the wisdom of the
mandatory and directory doctrine. Further, it is the principle that Owen
Dixon described as the reconciliation of the supremacy of the law and the
supremacy of Parliament. In this host of authorities, the Supreme Court
of Canada stands alone in its rejection of a mandatory and directory
provision doctrine whose purpose is to determine whether the framers of
the Constitution intend the validity of a statute or other proceeding to
depend upon compliance with the rule.
And we are left with the irony that the court, using principles of
necessity drawn from the crucible of war, revolution, and civil war,
unwittingly provides legal justification for the continued violation of the
right the court obviously intended to enforce. For if Manitoba does not
do as the court requires, what do we have in Manitoba? Chaos. And if
we have chaos we have, on the authority of the Supreme Court of
Canada itself, occasion for the invocation of necessity to clothe with
legitimacy that which, in the absence of the necessity, is illegitimate.
91. Supra, note 19 at 234.

